Case Name: United States v. Rodriguez-Felix (Click here for the full text of the case)

Court: 10th Circuit Court of Appeals

Date: June 02, 2006

Expert: Dr. Steven E. Clark. A professor with expertise in eyewitness identification decisions

Issues: The admissibility of expert testimony on the reliability of eyewitness identification.

Summary of case: Defendant Rodriguez-Felix was charged with the sale of cocaine. He was initially arrested for an unrelated crime. Four eyewitnesses later recognized him as a drug dealer who had sold cocaine to an informant and undercover officer. Rodriguez-Felix attempted to introduce the evidence of an expert witness on eyewitness identification reliability but the district court barred this testimony.

Role of the expert: Rodriquez-Felix attempted to present the testimony of Professor Clark, an expert on the reliability of eyewitness identification. Professor Clark would have testified about a model he was developing that related the conditions of an encounter and how they affect the reliability of eyewitness identification from that encounter.

Challenges to the Expert's testimony: The 10th Circuit ruled the district court correctly excluded the testimony of Dr. Clark under the standard that the standard set out in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993). The 10th Circuit outlined circumstances under which expert testimony of this nature could help a jury determine the credibility of a witness more so than normal cross-examination. The court cited cases and concluded expert testimony on eyewitness identification is admissible when there are problems with: 1) cross-racial identification 2) identification after a long delay, 3) identification after observation under stress 4) and under certain psychological phenomenon such as feedback factor and unconscious transference. Various courts have allowed testimony when one or some of these problems are present. The 20th Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the district court did not error when it excluded Dr. Clark’s testimony under the Daubert standard because none of these problems existed in this case and even if his testimony was erroneously excluded, it was a harmless mistake.

Summary prepared by B. Kass, Student, The University of California Hastings College of the Law